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Abstract
Compared to the 29 other members of OECD, Canadian workers must satisfy themselves with 
a rather timorous public pension system, particularly those who earn a middle or higher in-
come. This weakness is somewhat corrected by private pension organizations, but only a third 
of employees are covered by them. The author proposes that all workers have access to such 
programs and even that they are mandatory. There would be many of them; they would function 
on the basis of capitalization; they would be public or private. The choice of the capitalization 
financial principle is almost essential, due to future population aging. The author displays his 
convictions about these proposals, as well as practical ways to implement such a program. 
Key Words:  Population aging, Canadian public and private pension plans, pay-as-you-go and 
capitalization financial principles.
Résumé
Par rapport à ceux des 29 autres pays de l’OCDE, les travailleurs canadiens doivent se satis-
faire d’un système de pensions publiques plutôt timoré, particulièrement ceux qui gagnent un 
revenu moyen ou élevé. Cette faiblesse est corrigée, peut-on dire, par des systèmes de pensions 
privées, mais seulement le tiers des employés en bénéficient. L’auteur propose que tous les 
travailleurs aient accès à de tels programmes et même qu’ils soient obligatoires. Il y en aurait 
plusieurs ; ils seraient gérés suivant le principe de capitalisation ; ils seraient publics ou 
privés. Le choix du principe de capitalisation est presque essentiel, à cause du vieillissement 
futur de la population. L’auteur expose ses convictions là-dessus, de même que des moyens 
pratiques de réaliser un tel programme.
Mots-clés : Vieillissement de la population, systèmes canadiens de pensions publiques et 
privées, principes de financement « pay as you go » et de capitalisation. 
1.  Thanks to my son Olivier, and to the two readers of this text, its presentation is much bet-
ter than it would have been without their help.Jacques Henripin
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Introduction
Canadians are usually proud of their health insurance system as well as 
some other elements of their public life with socialist leanings. But most of 
them ignore the weakness of their public pension system. Canada is among 
the puniest countries of the western world in terms of access to what might 
be called a respectable public pension system. By “respectable,” I mean 
a system which secures a reasonable pension for everyone who has been 
working for 35 to 40 years of his or her life. 
What  is  reasonable?  In  its  annual  analysis  of  its  members’  public 
pensions, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) uses a  statistical concept that may serve as a guideline (OECD, 
2007:34–37). It is called “net replacement rate of mandatory pension pro-
grams,” that is, the ratio of the average pension entitlement, net of taxes, to 
the average preretirement earnings, net of taxes and contributions. For the 
thirty members of OECD, the average ratio for men is 70%; for Canada, it 
is 57.4%. Canada ranks 23rd and only 7 countries have a lower rate, among 
which is the USA, with 52.4%. It is worth underlining a Canadian particu-
larity: Canada is relatively “generous” for low-earning pensioners: for those 
whose preretirement earnings were half the average, the net replacement 
rate is 89.2% and Canada ranks 12th. But the rate is only 30.8% for earnings 
which are twice the national average and Canada’s rank is 26th  in that case. 
Here are some details for the OECD countries and for Canada: 
The table shows that the net replacement ratio decreases with increases 
in income, but at a much greater pace in the case of the Canadian public 
pension system: according to the figures above, the relative decline is about 
28% for the 30 OECD countries and 65% for Canada. Of course, as we will 
see, the Canadian public system is completed by other sources of income, 
particularly by private pensions. 
We first look at the sources of income for the elderly in Canada. The 
two main elements of Canada’s public pension will then be described brief-
ly, followed by an analysis of their weaknesses, with particular attention 
being given to their financial principle (pay as you go). Finally, different 
Income Net Replacement Rate
30 OECD Countries Canada
50% of the national average: 83.8% 89.2%
75% of the national average: 74.0% 68.3%
100% of the national average: 70.1% 57.4%
150% of the national average: 65.4% 40.0%
200% of the national average: 60.7% 30.8%Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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proposals for reform will be examined with two main purposes: setting up a 
more efficient financial system (which secures a higher pension for a given 
contribution) and ensuring a reasonable pension for all “full time workers.”
What are the Elderly Sources of Income?
Long Mo provides a very useful description of the sources of income for 
Canadians aged 65 and over in 2002 and 1980, based on Statistics Canada’s 
data (Long Mo, 2005). The reader will find its most salient aspects in Table 
1. Public pensions are divided here between what Long Mo calls “net trans-
fers” (Old Age Security [OAS] plus Guaranteed Income Supplement [GIS]) 
and Canada Pension Plan (including the Régime des rentes du Québec). 
We shall describe these elements later on. In 2002, public pensions were 
responsible for 31% of the elderly’s total income. In 1980, that figure was 
about the same (30%). Private pensions were a little more important than 
public ones in 2002 (32%), but not in 1980 (12%). In fact, they are the most 
important source of income since 1993.
One of the most remarkable features of Table 1 is the enormous differ-
ence in sources of income between rich and poor. In 2002, the mean income 
was $14,400 for the lower quintile and $54,100 for the upper one. The poor-
est relied on public pensions for 89% of their income (65% on Old Age 
Security and 24% on Canada Pension Plan). At the other end of the income 
distribution, the public pensions contribution was, on the whole, negative 
and the main source of income was work (43%), followed by private pen-
sions (40%).
It is interesting to amalgamate pensions related to and determined by 
contributions during working life, which excludes transfer payments (OAS 
and GIS). In 2002, pensions based on contributions represented 52% of total 
Table 1. Percentage Composition of  Income by Source for each 
Quintile of Canadians aged 65 and over, 2002
Source of Income Total
1st 
quintile 
(lower)
2nd 
quintile
3rd 
quintile
4th 
quintile
5th 
quintile
(upper) 
Net transfers* 12% 65% 40 20 6 -13
Canada Pension Plan ** 20 24 31 25 20 12
Private pensions 32 4 17 32 40 40
Investments 13 5 8 10 11 18
Work 24 2 5 12 23 43
* Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement
** Including the Régimes des rentes du Québec
Source: Long Mo, 2005, p. 146.income. That proportion varied among quintiles: 28% for the lower 
quintile; 48% for the second; 57–60% for the three upper quintiles.
That is a fine diversity of income sources, but some elements are 
questionable: labour income normally has a short duration and invest-
ments constitute a minor element, except for the well-off; there is 
no provision for sharing years of life expectancy among individuals, 
something that pension systems do; and transfer payments, almost by 
definition, have a limited number of beneficiaries. It is therefore prob-
ably wiser, for ordinary citizens, to rely mostly on public or private 
pension funds. There is no problem in combining both, as is the case 
in Canada. But the combination is not quite satisfactory: the Canadian 
public system is rather modest and the more generous private pension 
funds are limited to a minority of workers. We will come back soon to 
a critical examination of the Canada Pension Plan. For the moment, 
though, let us describe briefly the major aspects of the Canadian pub-
lic pension system.
The Two Elements of the Canadian Public Pension 
System
The original component of this system, Old Age Security, has been 
supplemented more recently by another element, the Guaranteed In-
come Supplement (GIS). Their combination ensures an annual min-
imum income of $13,400 for a single person. The only requirement is 
residence in Canada (more precisely, 40 years of residence after the 
age of 18 for a full pension). For the last few years, its basic element, 
OAS  ($5,900),  is  reduced  progressively  when  the  annual  income 
reaches $60,000 and disappears at about $110,000. It is price-indexed 
and might be considered a form of social assistance. The total amount 
spent by the federal government for OAS and GIS was $30.3 billion 
in 2006–2007 (about 2% of GDP).
The second component of the system, the Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP), is linked to past contributions of retirees. It was established in 
1966 and is administered by the federal government, except for the 
province of Québec, which manages its Régime des rentes du Québec 
separately. The two systems are almost perfect twins and in the rest 
of this paper, my references to the Canada Pension Plan should be 
understood as referring to both. This regime is characterized by the 
following features:Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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•  It offers a pension equal to 25% of the average preretirement income 
(exclusive of those 15% of working years where one’s income was 
lowest), assuming 40 years of contribution. Earlier salaries are adjusted 
to variations in the average national salary.
•  All workers are submitted to the system, except for those who earn less 
than $3,500 a year and the system has a ceiling: it ignores all revenues 
over the average national salary (now $41,000).
•  Due to that ceiling, the amount of the maximum annual pension is now 
$10,250.
•  The system is primarily financed according to the pay-as-you-go prin-
ciple (PAYG), which means, essentially, that pensions distributed dur-
ing a particular year are financed by the contributions made in the same 
year. However, revenues are, for the moment at least, slightly higher 
than  expenses:  in  2006,  revenues  were  $43.4  billion  and  expenses 
$34.4 billion (2.3% of GDP). As a result, a fund is accumulated. In 
2007, the CPP (not including the Québec twin) had about $117 billion 
to invest. A rough estimate including Québec would bring the amount 
to about $140 billion. That makes the CPP’s financial basis a hybrid 
system: it is mostly PAYG, with a fragment of financial capitalization. 
•  In the first few years after its establishment, there were few pensioners 
per contributing worker and the contribution rate was modest: 3.6% of 
the salary covered by the system, shared equally between the employee 
and the employer. With the aging of the population, and expected future 
aging, this rate had to be adjusted to 9.9%, also equally shared.  
Advantages and Weaknesses of the Canadian  
Public Pensions System
One thing is clear: the Canadian public pension system is strongly oriented 
towards ensuring a minimum living standard for every one, including those 
who never worked. It is also rather timid, if not timorous, in contributing to 
a decent pension for all workers. In other words, Canada leaves a remark-
ably large proportion of retirement replacement income to private initia-
tive: it ensures at best only 25% of the average past yearly income (under 
an income ceiling of $41,000). Employers (including governments for the 
benefit of public servants) have succeeded in assuming an appreciable part 
of the noncovered income; the rest lies fallow: the majority of Canadian Jacques Henripin
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workers have no access to a supplementary pension system. It is interest-
ing to note, in passing, that even the United States is more successful than 
Canada in covering its workers with a public pension system. This is a first 
main weakness.
A second weakness is the way the CPP is financed: the pay-as-you-go 
principle. Pensions distributed during a given year are financed by contribu-
tions collected during the same year. Most Western countries, if not all, have 
adopted that principle. Opposed to that is a system referred to as “capital-
ization,” through which subscribers pay a regular contribution during their 
whole working life. These amounts are used by the fund administrators to 
buy shares and bonds, so that the fund is fed by two sources: participants’ 
contributions and the investment returns collected by the fund administra-
tors. That supplementary source of revenue makes quite a difference, as we 
shall see in the next section.
When the population is relatively young, a PAYG system can function 
with relatively low contributions, since there are many workers who con-
tribute per pensioner. However, with the aging of the population, there are 
fewer and fewer workers for each pensioner. In countries like Italy, France, 
and Germany, all of which are characterized by generous pensions based on 
the PAYG principle, the situation will soon become unsustainable; in the 
United States, it will become very difficult, as indicated by various recent 
proposals to lighten the costs of the system. In Canada, population aging 
will have the same effect as in other countries, but the object submitted to 
this effect is much smaller. One might say that the Canada Pension Plan 
is “saved” by its stinginess, so that  there is ample space for a more effi-
cient capitalization system. In fact, as we have noted, that space is partially, 
but by no means entirely, occupied by employers’ private plans. In 2003, 
only 39% of Canadian employees were covered by these private plans, and 
that percentage is diminishing (Morissette and Ostrovsky, 2006:45); these 
programs were responsible for 30–32% of elderly income, more than the 
contribution of the almost universal Canada Pension Plan, which, despite 
its modest contribution to retired workers, absorbs as much as 10% of their 
income.
To put it simply, Canada does not offer a respectable pension system to 
all its workers. What is the solution? To remedy that situation by enlarging 
the present pay-as-you-go system would be unsustainable within 25 years, as 
it shall be in Italy, France, and Germany (Bongaarts, 2004; Robson, 1996:22). 
It seems that Canada should adopt the capitalization model, either to replace 
the present CPP-RRQ system, or to complete it by a compulsory capitaliza-
tion system. It is sometimes argued that the RRSP (Registered Retirement 
Savings Plan) is a substitute for the CPP deficiencies. That is partly true, but Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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the RRSP does not play an important role of pension systems: to equalize or 
share the duration of retirement period between individuals; everyone has to 
bet on the income necessary to cover his or her retirement duration.  
The Advantage of the Capitalization Financial Principle 
It should be obvious that a pension system financed only by contributions 
is more expensive than one which adds a second source, especially if that 
second source is “invisible.” Let us illustrate the difference by using a very 
simple model. Assume that a generation is characterized as follows:
•  Every worker (woman or man) enters the labour force at the age of 20 
and retires at 65.
•  Salary is 60 units per year at age 20; it increases progressively up to 90 
at 35 years of age, 100 at age 50, and then decreases slowly to 93 at age 
65. The annual average is 90 units.
•  All workers contribute 10% of their salary to a pension plan.
These contributions are accumulated in a fund that belongs solely to 
that particular generation, so to speak, and the total amount is intended to 
pay for the pensions after the age of 65. According to the specifications 
of our model, the sum of contributions, at the age of 65, is 405 units per 
person; with an average life expectancy of about 19 years after retirement, 
this allows for a pension of 21 units per year, which amounts to only 23% 
of the average salary. This percentage is close to the replacement rate of the 
Canada Pension Plan.
Let us note also that the latter calculation does not include any inter-
est or dividend on any kind of securities or loans. That, again, is close to 
the Canadian system, which is fundamentally a pay-as-you-go scheme, al-
though it also contains a small fund which produces some return on loans. 
Our model was designed as a “capitalized” system, the main charac-
teristic of which is that each generation constructs its own fund during its 
working life and uses it only after retirement age. Of course, it would be 
foolish to leave the fund idle and not use it to gain interest or dividends 
by buying securities on the stock market or other investments. One is as-
tonished by the huge contribution added by this supplementary source of 
revenues. Table 2 presents the most significant elements of the calculations 
necessary to compare the “idle” funding (no return on capital lending) with 
the total “revenues” (contributions plus returns on loans) of an “active” 
funding, according to different annual rates of return (2, 3, and 4%).Jacques Henripin
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The first line of Table 2 corresponds to a pay-as-you-go system with 
a population having an age distribution similar to the distribution of years 
lived at different ages (L column in a life table) or, for that matter, by a gen-
eration. Comparing each subsequent line with the first gives a clear image 
of the advantages of a “capitalized” system: even with the rather low annual 
rate of return of 2%, the annual pension doubles; it is multiplied threefold 
with a 3% rate of return and almost fourfold if the rate is 4%. 
We assume here that these rates of return are “real” rates, which means 
there is no inflation. There is no advantage in complicating the model by 
introducing such a parameter. We also note that, given the experience of pen-
sion funds during the last decades, even a real rate of 4% is rather modest.
One should also keep in mind that the relative importance of returns in 
the total revenues of the fund depends on the duration of the contribution 
period: if, for instance, the retirement age is set at 60 instead of 65, the value 
of the fund at the age of retirement is reduced by about 10% when the rate 
of return is 2%, and by about 11% if the rate is 4%. Of course, the pension 
would also have to be reduced because of the increased duration of the pen-
sion period. We will address this question later on.
Some readers might be concerned about certain simplistic features of 
our model: full-time work from 20–65 years of age, and no unemployment, 
for instance; those elements do not distort significantly the relative advan-
tage of capitalization.
A Look at the Real Age Distribution
The financial principle generally chosen by Western countries, for their 
public pension, is the pay-as-you-go system. There are two main reasons 
for that choice:
Table 2. Total Contributions, Total Returns during Working Life and 
during Total Life, and Annual Pension, according to Different Annual 
Rates of Return: 0, 2, 3, 4%
Annual 
rate of 
return
Cumulated 
contributions 
at age 65
Cumulated 
contributions and 
returns at age 65
Amount corrected 
for returns after 
age 65
Annual 
pension
0 % 405 405 405 21
2 % 405 664 813 43
3 % 405 825 1,109 58
4 % 405 1,045 1,538 81
Note: Monetary units are totally arbitrary. Annual salary varies from 60 at age 20 to 100 at 50 and 93 at 65 years of 
age. Contribution is 10% of salary. The correction appearing in the penultimate column takes into account the fact 
that the fund does not disappear when the generation reaches the age of 65; at that age, the value of the fund and 
its returns only start diminishing.Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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1.  The PAYG system does not require any past contribution to receive 
a partial or full pension; a full pension may even be given to workers 
who have contributed only a few years. Of course, regulations may 
prescribe a minimum number of contribution years, but that is largely 
arbitrary. Such a system is defined by law, so that rights and obligations 
are only limited by legislators’ common sense.
2.  The age structure of these countries’ population was, and still is, much 
younger than the distribution of years lived by a generation at differ-
ent ages according to the life table. The latter distribution is used for 
calculating contributions and pensions in a capitalized system. But in a 
PAYG system, the basis is the existing population age structure. Clear-
ly, the age distribution was an appealing factor in the decision taken at 
the time these systems were instituted — and even today.
Another somewhat ideological “advantage” could be added: the inter-
generational financial relations through which adults pay for their parents’ 
pension. This is viewed as a kind of moral virtue in many countries. One 
wonders why present and future adults should pay for the pension of parents 
who experienced a quite comfortable economic situation and did not even 
succeed in raising enough children to fully replace their generation!
A pension system is a device through which the product of adult work 
is partly devoted to old age needs. Its fundamental mechanism is strongly 
determined by what one may call the “adult/elderly ratio.” In the case of 
the pay-as-you-go systems, that ratio takes the form of the number of adult 
workers compared to the number of retired workers at a particular time, 
which is strongly related to the number of adults (let us say 18–65 years 
of age) compared to the number of persons 65 and over. Let us call it the 
“population adult/elderly ratio.” For the capitalization system, the corres-
ponding elements are the number of years lived during adulthood by a gen-
eration compared to the number of years lived over 65: the “lived-years 
adult/elderly ratio.”
Figure 1 shows the evolution of these two ratios for Canada: a) the 
population ratio from 1966–2051; b) the lived-years ratio according to Can-
adian life tables of 1966–2001. Two salient phenomena are worth noticing:
1.  The population ratio dropped dramatically from 7.2 in 1966 to 5.1 in 
2001; the curve should continue to decrease at about the same speed 
until 2011, and then more sharply from 2011 to 2031, when it will reach 
2.5, according to Statistics Canada’s (medium) projection 2 (George et 
al., 2001). This amounts to a reduction of 65% in 65 years.
2.  The “lived-years ratio” has varied much more slowly: from 3.7 in the 
1966 life table to 2.8 in the 2001 life table.Jacques Henripin
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More important, perhaps, previous population ratios have been much 
higher than the lived-years ratios. In 2001, the former was about 5 adults 
per elder, whereas in terms of lived years, the ratio was 2.8. The curves 
imply that the next quarter century will still be characterized by a temporary 
demographic situation which favours a PAYG system. That advantage is not 
necessarily sufficient to override the interests and dividends of a capitalized 
system, but it is still important.
How do the advantages of each system compare? More precisely, how 
does the return on securities of the capitalized system compare with the 
advantage of a still relatively young population? Of course, the answer de-
pends on the rate of returns on loaned capital, relative to the advantage 
of the age composition of the population at a given time. The capitalized 
system has the obvious and exclusive advantage of returns on securities; a 
PAYG system, as long as the age composition of the population is younger 
than the distribution of lived years between adulthood and old age, has the 
particular advantage of collecting contributions from a large number of 
working adults for the benefit of a relatively small number of pensioners. 
The comparison can be figured out quantitatively. 
According to the 2001 life table, the ratio of years lived in adulthood 
on years lived in old age was 2.8; and we have seen that in these condi-
tions, a 2% rate of return on securities, in the capitalized system, produ-
ces a remarkable advantage: a doubling of the pension, given a determined 
contribution; or, to put it the other way, a given pension can be financed 
with half the contribution that would be necessary if there were no return 
on securities. Here, the population age composition plays no role. How-
Figure 1
Ratio of adults to elderly (18- 65  /  65+):
Canadian population and life table lived-years,
 1966 to 2051
0
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8
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population ratio
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ever, it is determinant in the PAYG system. In 2001, the “population ratio” 
(18–64/65+) was 5.1, compared to a corresponding “lived-years ratio” of 
2.8. The advantage of this age composition is obvious: we have here almost 
twice the number of adults per elder than what the lived-years ratio offers. 
Yet, to match the benefits of the capitalized system — assuming a 2% re-
turn rate — the “population ratio” should be at least twice the “lived-years 
ratio,” that is 5.6 instead of 5.1. We can then decide that the capitalized 
system is preferable, at least in terms of financial efficiency, and will be 
increasingly so with the aging of the Canadian population.
One has to go back to 1960 to find an adult/elder population ratio which 
is twice the corresponding lived-years ratio. Here is a series of these com-
parisons:
Even in 1966, when the Canada Pension Plan was set up, the PAYG 
principle was less efficient, financially speaking, than a capitalized system 
associated with a 2% return on capital, which is rather modest. It is true 
that until 2010, the superiority of the capitalized system is not very large. It 
will, though, become more and more important afterwards, as the Canadian 
population ages. 
It is also true that financing efficiency is not the only criterion for choos-
ing a financial device. It is probable that in 1966, governments were eager 
to favour old workers who, in a purely capitalized system, would have been 
entitled only to a very meagre pension. It should also be mentioned that the 
Canada Pension Plan was not purely PAYG: actuaries managed to develop a 
limited fund, so that provinces could borrow money at a low interest rate (a 
practice which was later abandoned). Compared to a purely capitalized sys-
tem, however, the size of this fund is almost negligible (Brown, 1996:59).
Switching to a Capitalized Public Pension System
This is not a simple and easy move. The main problem lies in the difficulty 
of financing two systems at the same time. There is obviously no problem 
Year Population 18-64/65+ Lived-years 18-64/65+ Population/Lived-years
1960 7.4 3.7 2.0
1981 6.2 3.3 1.9
2001 5.1 2.8 1.8
2011 4.5 2.7 1.7
2021 3.3 2.6 * 1.3
2031 2.5 2.5 * 1.0
* ExtrapolationJacques Henripin
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in setting up a new capitalized pension fund (or many of them, as I shall 
propose later); that happens every year. But how can the old system finance 
its liabilities? Suppose the new capitalized system has been set up in 2006. 
Normally, from then on, all workers would contribute to the new system 
only and there would be no other source of revenues to finance the pensions 
promised by the old system. 
Let us illustrate that more concretely by going back to our simplified 
model: we will suppose again that everyone works from 20–65 years of age 
and dies at the age of 84; that their average annual income is 90 units; and 
that the contribution rate is 10%, which is practically the same as that of the 
existing system (9.9%). If the return rate of the new system fund is 2%, and 
the retirement age is 65, the system would permit an annual pension of 43 
units (whereas the old PAYG system can supply only 22.5 units). 
All those who were workers or retirees in 2005 have earned a right to 
a pension from the old system, the size of which depends on their average 
salary and on the number of subscription years, that is their age. Those aged 
60, for instance, who have subscribed for 40 years, will be soon entitled 
to an almost full pension (around 20 units). These rights will last until the 
youngest workers of 2005, who have contributed a few years, have died, 
that is around 2086.  The problem is that in principle, with the switch to the 
new system in 2006, income earners cease to contribute to the old system 
and there is no source of revenues to pay for old-system pensions, except 
for the very small fund of the Canada Pension Plan and the Régime des 
rentes du Québec. In 2006, the total amount of these funds was about $140 
billion, whereas the annual amount of pensions to be paid was $34 billion. 
As a result, only four years of the annual expenditures of the old system are 
covered. Moreover, annual expenditures will tend to increase until 2030, 
due to the increase in the number of pensioners. From then on, it will start 
to diminish since the pensioners of the old system will have an increasingly 
fractional right to a pension. The eldest retirees will have died and been 
replaced by new retirees whose pension will be partially financed by the 
new system. That substitution period will last about seventy-five years, after 
which all pensioners will be totally financed by the new system.  
On the whole, the unfunded liabilities of the old system, if it came to a 
close in 2006, would be of the order of $2,000 billion, which is a third more 
than the annual gross domestic product of Canada. The annual liabilities of 
the first 25 years after the old system comes to an end amount to $34–50 
billion and they represent 2–3 % of annual GDP. Thirty-four to fifty bil-
lion dollars is not a trifle. It is more than the federal government’s annual 
expenditures for the service of the public debt; it is also twice the combined 
annual sales of beer, wine, and liquor stores in the country.  Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
CSP 2009, 36.1–2, Spring/Summer: 17–36  29
We don’t have to consider the technicalities of this transition problem. 
But it is useful to review briefly what kind of financial strategy could be 
envisaged. 
Some Rough Estimates
If we suppose that the new system is based, like the old one, on a contri-
bution of 10% of income (with the same ceiling as the old one), the total 
amount of the annual contributions would also be about the same as in 2006: 
about $40 billion. Since there is yet no retiree who can claim a pension 
based on the new system, that amount can be totally devoted to the fund and 
invested. Following years would produce revenues of the same order, but 
part of them would have to be devoted to small pensions paid to the “new 
pensioners.” (These first pensions will be small because they are the product 
of only a few years of contribution to the new system.) It is clear that the 
fund would soon become quite important, but it cannot be used — at least 
not totally — to meet the liabilities of the old system, since the advantage of 
the new one is precisely based on lending money provided by the fund, so 
that interest and dividends can double or triple future pensions. 
One solution to our dual financing problem would be to tax part of the 
return on the new fund, to finance at least part of the old one. We should 
remember that according to our simplified model, a return rate of 2% a year 
allows for a pension which is double the pension of a PAYG system. That is 
a formidable advantage. But a 2% rate is quite modest and it is not impos-
sible that in the long run, an average rate of 3 or 4% will be observed. Of 
course, we speak of real return rates, that is, after currency devaluation is 
taken into account. This would create some financial leeway to manage the 
transition to the new system. It would probably be possible for the govern-
ment to tax the return in excess of 2%, for instance, and to use this revenue 
to pay for old-system pensions. Above a 2% return, the tax could even be 
100%, since that would still leave a palatable advantage to participants to 
the new system. After all, if such a tax is the price to pay for a new system 
which can double the pensions offered by the old one, why not?
Due to the small size of the “new” fund during the first decades of its 
existence, the returns would be small and an appreciable amount of money 
would have to be borrowed or acquired one way or another by the govern-
ment (to pay for the “old pensions”); but as the new system approaches ma-
turity, the “tax on returns” (or the collection of any return over 2%) would 
permit reimbursing the amounts borrowed at the beginning of the new sys-
tem. Jacques Henripin
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I have made approximate estimates of key values of both systems (old 
and new) during the transition period, which would last for almost a cen-
tury. These are very far from what an actuary could do; their only claim is to 
give a rough idea of the size of the problems involved. Let us assume that:
•  the present system has been closed in 2006, but the governments (fed-
eral and Québec) have to meet the liabilities of the old system;
•  the new system covers the same range of individual revenues as the old 
one, that is all income over $3500 and under $41,000 a year;
•  the contribution rate of the new system is 10%;
•  the real rate of return on the new system’s fund is 4%.
In these circumstances, the annual expenditures linked to the old PAYG 
system would increase from $35 billion in 2006 to about $50 billion in 
2030 and then decrease to zero around 2080. The cumulative value of these 
amounts is of course enormous: $1,000 billion around 2030 and $2,000 bil-
lion around 2060.
The small funds of the old system (around $140 billion) would cover 
only the first four years. Let us see what a tax on the return of the new sys-
tem can do. We have supposed that the real return rate is 4% and that the 
governments would levy half of it. That would leave a “net rate of return” of 
2% a year for the new pensions, which, despite the tax, would still produce a 
pension of about half the average salary. Since the new fund would be small 
during the first decades, the result of this tax would also be relatively small 
until 2030. At that time, cumulated yearly taxes on the new fund’s returns 
would reach about $300 billion, whereas cumulated liabilities from the old 
system would attain $1,000 billion; it is only around 2075 that the former 
would catch up with the latter. Between 2006 and 2075, an enormous debt 
would have to be met. 
It seems then that taxing part of the returns of the new system would be 
at best a partial solution. What else could be done? Probably a combination 
of different means. Here are a few possible strategies:
1.  The old PAYG system could be maintained and combined with a new, 
minimum capitalization one; for instance, a “new” contribution of 5% 
would permit a supplementary pension of 20–25% of average income. 
Combined with the old system, the total pension would be 45–50% of 
average income.  
2.  Of course, the old system can be kept and combined with a new, strong-
er, capitalized system. This would resemble the situation of Canadian 
civil servants and employees of many private firms. In these cases, a Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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common arrangement is a contribution of around 12–15% of salary 
(over the contribution to the CPP), which allows for a pension close to 
60–70% of the average salary. Such a situation illustrates the advantage 
of a capitalization system: a contribution 50% superior to that required 
by the CPP (15% compared to 10%) produces a supplementary pension 
almost twice as large (45% versus 25% of average salary).
3.  The PAYG system could be abandoned;  no further contributions would 
be collected and the pensions owed to those who have contributed 
would be financed by the Treasury. Such a liability would be equiva-
lent in size (if not higher), for at least 40 years, to the interest on pub-
lic debts of the federal and Québec governments (around $40 billion 
yearly at the present time). Such a supplementary expenditure could be 
reduced by “taxing” the revenues of the new system.
4.  In the present CPP system, there are many minor advantages which 
could be abolished or reduced: death allowance, elimination of the 15% 
smallest yearly incomes in the calculation of the average income, for 
instance. Moreover, the system includes benefits for disabled workers 
(19% of total CPP expenses) as well as for spouse and young children. 
Many rules could be changed. According to a study of the federal and 
provincial governments (Canada, 1996:33–44), one can roughly esti-
mate that the CPP expenditures could be reduced by nearly 20% by 
curtailing these advantages. 
These estimates must be interpreted as rough approximations. Again, 
my main purpose is to illustrate the difficulties related to the abolition of our 
present system, as well as the advantages of an eventual compulsory cap-
italized system. Eleven countries, including Sweden, have introduced that 
last element: a compulsory participation in private pension plans (OECD, 
2007:81).
Some Corollary Measures
A network of private and public pension funds
If a mandatory capitalized system were ever established for all income earn-
ers, even with a ceiling similar to the existing one, the total value of the fund 
would soon become enormous. Let us assume again that the contribution 
rate would be 10% of earned income. Within 25 or 30 years, the value of the 
accumulated fund would be close to the gross national output and perhaps Jacques Henripin
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twice that value around 2075. This is a formidable amount of money. But 
that money is not idle: it is invested in securities, bonds, buildings, etc. In 
fact, it will have to be invested in all sorts of capital, because an amount 
which is twice the GNP is approximately half of the national capital stock: 
airports, highways, houses, factories, hospitals, schools, etc. It would be 
unwise and even dangerous to leave half of the national capital in the hands 
of a single board of administrators. 
The solution, naturally, is to split this very peculiar market into many 
institutions. Whether they are public or private does not matter much, since 
they would all function with the same purpose and under the same state 
regulations. There could be room for innovation, and some competition be-
tween the different institutions would be welcomed. In fact, that is not so 
different from existing private funds. The main difference would be that 
each income earner would be compelled to subscribe to one of the funds up 
to a minimum contribution. It would be possible to switch from one fund 
to the other. 
What would be the role of employers and the present private pension 
systems? I do not see any necessity to eliminate them, provided they respect 
the new rules. They have had the historical merit of filling an important gap 
in our society and, after all, the new system would be a duplicate of them. 
The main differences would be that: a) access to an adequate pension would 
no longer be limited to public servants and employees of large enterprises; 
b) participation in a system which offers a suitable pension would no longer 
be dependent on a particular employer. Present private pension funds could 
then be transformed into funds open to any income earner. Otherwise, they 
could transfer to newly established funds the accumulated rights and cor-
responding funds of their subscribers. 
After all, there is no philosophical or ethical principle that constrains an 
entrepreneur to ensure that his employees have a wise distribution of their 
salary between adulthood and old age. That is a personal responsibility, pro-
vided an acceptable device exists.
Retirement age and flexibility
In any kind of pension system, a “normal” retirement age is determined, 
usually 65 years old. Some countries have already decided to increase that 
age by one or two years, which is justified by the increase in life expectancy 
and  health improvements. Canada will probably imitate these countries. At 
a roundtable on retirement income system, Robert Brown, a well-known 
Canadian professor specializing in these matters, insisted on the necessity 
to increase the normal retirement age up to 69 years old: “I think it is sale-Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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able. In fact, I don’t even care whether it is saleable or not. I think it is 
inevitable” (Brown, 1996:71).
Whatever the decision taken on this issue, a certain degree of flexibility 
should be maintained. It should be possible, as it is now, to retire at any time 
from 60–70 years of age (or some other age), provided that pensions are 
adapted properly so that from an actuarial point of view, neither the retiree 
nor the fund is unduly favoured. That would represent a change from the 
many “gifts” of existing private plans in favour of early retirement.
The bizarre advantage of being married
It is very common for private pension systems to allocate a partial but sub-
stantial fraction of one’s pension to the surviving spouse. Such a spouse 
pension is also provided by the Canada Pension Plan, including common-
law marriages, but with some restrictions. The origin of that allocation is 
no mystery: half a century ago, most widows had no right to a personal 
pension; they often lost their husband when their children (more numer-
ous than now) were still young; it was then most desirable to give them at 
least a partial pension. With the arrival of gender equality, that pension was 
attributed to widowers, even if very few of them were without a personal 
pension or revenue.
At the present time, in most cases, at least for widowers, this surviving 
spouse pension is a kind of reward for the simple merit of having married. 
It is also true that, even now, many mothers sacrifice part of their adulthood 
to raising their children and are partly deprived of an adequate pension for 
that reason. I would propose that the surviving spouse pension be based 
on the number of years affected by child raising. It would be available for 
men as well as women. May I mention that a similar element is included in 
the Canada Pension Plan: in the calculation of the average annual income 
(which is a basis for determining the size of the pension), years of child 
raising can be ignored.
Increasing gross domestic product
This is not a particularly original idea. Indeed, in any situation, increases in 
national production are welcomed. However, it is especially important in re-
acting to the challenges raised by an aging population. We have showed the 
huge cost of getting rid of our present public pension system. Increases in 
production would facilitate the payment of our present system’s liabilities. 
Pensions vary with the price index, but not necessarily with productivity. Jacques Henripin
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Consequently, whatever the source of income used to pay for past liabilities, 
any production increase would lighten the burden. Moreover, aging does 
not affect only pension costs; it plays an equivalent role for health costs.
Coming back to the pension system, it seems clear that postponing the 
retirement age would have important benefits. First, postponement has a 
powerful effect within the pension system itself: for a given contribution 
rate, retiring at 66 instead of 65 years of age increases the annual pension by 
7–9%, depending on the average number of working years. Conversely, the 
same postponement would reduce the annual contribution rate by 7–9% for 
a given pension. Postponing retirement also increases personal income and 
state revenues, which will be useful in facing the costs of aging.
As a supplementary advantage, a totally funded pension system repre-
sents an enormous source of savings available for private or public invest-
ments. In fact, it is a compulsory saving machine. That should also contrib-
ute to production increase. 
Old Age Security
A great number of less fortunate citizens would have to be exempted from 
participating, as they are today. It goes without saying that the Old Age Se-
curity program, completed by the Guaranteed Income Supplement, should 
be maintained. Their future cost would be reduced by an increasing propor-
tion of workers who would have access to a gained and sufficient pension.
Conclusion
In examining the present situation of old age replacement income in Can-
ada, my main purpose was to fill important gaps in the Canadian pension 
system, so that Canada can join the most successful Western countries or at 
least take a middle position among them. For the moment, Canada is still far 
from it, given that two-thirds of workers are deprived of any pension system 
insuring a satisfactory replacement income. I have also tried to demonstrate 
that a fully capitalized pension system is much preferable to a PAYG sys-
tem, given the future aging of the population. Nevertheless, it will be very 
difficult to get rid of the present system, due to the enormous sum of liabil-
ities in favour of workers who have already subscribed to the system. I have 
estimated the most strategic elements of that problem and suggested some 
ways to succeed in that difficult transition. My calculations were rough and 
in no way can compete with the computations of actuaries. But as the great Aging and the Necessity of a Radical Reform of the Canadian Pension System  
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philosopher Karl Popper quite wisely remarked, it is not always necessary 
for science to be accurate. Neither is it for politics.
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